Where do the architects live? by Kolb, David
By way of an Introduction:  These pages contain individual chapters from 
my 1990 book, Postmodern Sophistications. I have obtained the rights to 
the essays am making them available separately. The entire text of the 
book is also available on Research Gate.  
The underlying aim of this collection of essays was to question the 
opposition between the Sophists and Plato. That classic dispute has been 
the model for many discussions of tensions within our society:: on the 
one hand you have the clever manipulative salesmen who care nothing 
about truth. On the other hand the rigorous scientific investigation that 
never quite makes contact with politics. Rootless nihilism vs. naturally 
grounded values. Anarchy vs. Rules. 
These essays developed a pragmatic middleground, using ideas from 
Heidegger and Dewey; in later writings I rely more on Hegel. But the 
point remains the same: don't listen to the Straussians and others who try 
to force our thinking (or our politics or art or philosophy)into a blunt 
opposition between truth-loving traditionalists (Socrates) and flaky 
relativistic postmoderns (the Sophists). It was not so simple in Greece 
and it's not so simple today. 
Part of the book deals with postmodern critiques of rational knowledge, 
with Lyotard and Habermas on center stage. Their opposition remains 
relevant, although post-1990 developments in deconstruction and critical 
theory have widened and deepened the debate. The points made in 
these essays remain useful, if not complete. 
The second part of the book deals with architecture, where modern and 
postmodern staged a public standoff. The word postmodern has now 
gone out of fashion in architecture. But the earlier use of the term still 
applies to the attempt to weave historical references back into 
architectural practices that had been taught to seek formal purity. .   
I stand by my diagnosis of postmodern architecture as just another 
modern distance from history, and my argument that that modern 
architecture's proclaimed distance from history was itself an illusion. We 
are more embedded in history than the moderns wanted to think, 
although that embodiment is not as total and restrictive as they imagined 
for our ancestors. 
If you find any of these ideas useful, true, provocative, let me know. If 
you find them absurd or useless airy nothings, I'd still be delighted to 
learn from your reactions. 
David Kolb, January 2018
Charles A. Dana Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Bates College
davkolb@gmail.com, www.dkolb.org, mobile 547 868 4713
This essays asks whether it is really possible to be detached from history.
Chapter 9. Where Do the Architects Live?
 We hear a great deal about local context these days. Even the jet-set creators of 
signature buildings deliver some words about context before they drop their creations into 
the midst of cities. Architects flit here and there, checking out the native languages. 
Perhaps the architects' designs treat this language ironically; perhaps they treat it earnestly. 
But where do the architects live?
 In this chapter I will argue against universalism in architecture, whether modern or 
postmodern. Changing the modern "no!" against history into the postmodern "let it all in!" 
solves nothing. The significant move would be to accept some languages, some design 
vocabularies, as native, yet without saying that the architect lives in the fixed, bounded 
space of possibilities we attribute to the traditional, pre-modern mentality.
 In the heyday of modernism architectural school often began with a course devised 
at the Bauhaus, in which the students worked through a series of exercises whose purpose 
was to make them confront colors, shapes, and materials directly. The students were to 
learn to deal with colors and materials in a way free from traditional ideas about 
appropriate design. The course was to liberate the students, to help them begin anew, 
without historical prejudice, as pure designers confronting pure problems. Thus the 
students could help develop that universal design language that modernism sought for the 
new civilization.
 In his theories about modernization Max Weber claimed that any remaining 
pockets of substantive traditional values were being pushed to the margins of life by the 
triumphant march of instrumental rationality. The modern movement in architecture made 
similar claims. There might be external constraints on the new universal culture and its 
designs, but there were no intrinsic limitations within the new culture itself, since it was 
not based on prescribed substantive values and social roles.
 The modernist universal language has become suspect in recent years, but it is not 
clear what is supposed to replace it. Almost no one suggests a simple revival of the 
traditional styles. Instead, we have ironic re-use of traditional materials. This postmodern 
irony also appears to have no particular shape of its own and no internal limits. It replays 
modern universalism with the signs reversed. But where do the architects live?
 We need to think about the location of the architects, not just about the client's 
semiotic code or taste culture. What does it mean for the architect to have limits and 
native languages? A limit is where something ends, but it is also, like a native language, 
where something begins.
 Modernism presupposes that once the self or society has been purified of 
traditional restriction it will face an unlimited field of possible actions. There may be 
contingent constraints of many kinds, but in principle our purified vision and action begin 
afresh with the widest field of possibilities. In contrast I want to assert that history opens 
only limited possibilities. The architect lives somewhere definite, with his or her own 
native languages.
 At first glance it seems a cliché to say the architect lives in a definite place. There 
are a host of factors, none of which seem especially dramatic, which locate the architect: 
her early experience, education, books read, buildings seen, what is current in the 
profession, what the public will pay for, regional taste, available materials, the quality of 
local construction skills, and the like. For example, to be an architect in Maine where I 
live means you are surrounded by the historical presence of northern New England 
villages and mill towns, several typical styles of wood construction, including plain 
farmhouses and shingle style cottages, the cold climate, and other factors all of which are 
quite different from what might influence an architect working in Atlanta. The Maine 
architect may sketch a form but decide it was not salable, or that the materials were not 
available, or that it would not fit in with the rest of the town. We all live somewhere and 
suffer various influences. So what?
 What is at stake is this: could the Maine architect, though in fact limited by various 
regional factors, in principle access an unlimited field of possible forms and styles? This is 
the modern (and often the postmodern) claim that presupposes the detached modern self 
and society.
 We need to examine how the architect relates to possibilities. In one sense, this is 
a very abstract issue. For the architect does not relate to "possibilities;" the architect deals 
with designs that are acceptable to the client or not, constructible or not, and other 
practical limitations that cannot be easily joined into some master list of what is "possible."
 But the mundane issues hide a deeper question. In deciding what the client could 
be persuaded to accept, or what shapes the local trades could construct, the architect 
relates to a certain background. What is the repertory from which the recommended form 
is drawn? What are the limits, if any, of the field of possible forms that the architect works 
from?
 I will explore this question by considering several suggestions. In deciding what is 
concretely possible the architect might draw from a repertory that consists of all possible 
forms, or all historical forms, or all forms the architect has experienced. None of these 
suggestions will prove adequate, but examining them will help us understand about limits 
to the language of architecture.
Does Architecture Speak a Language?
 Concerning limits, in this and later chapters I will be referring to architectural 
languages and vocabularies. Though this is a common way of speaking about architecture, 
the practice needs some defense.[(Cf. Donougho 1987 for a helpful study of the various 
ways in which architecture might be said to involve a language.) It seems clear that if we 
define language strictly then architecture does not possess a language. (Though it is also 
true that in many of its uses language itself is less "language"-like than some philosophers 
would have us believe.) 
Current discussions about the nature of language mostly center around the structure 
of sentences and what constitutes their meaning. Architecture contains no sentences; 
buildings do not combine their parts to make predicative or relational assertions.
 Roger Scruton makes this the key to his argument that all talk about architectural 
languages and vocabularies should be scrapped in favor of talk about conventions and 
styles (cf. Scruton 1979, and, in reply, Donougho 1987, Rustin 1985).
 However, architecture does have something analogous to words, namely the 
elements in architectural design that stand in mutual contrasts within chains of substitution 
and combination. For example, consider the classical orders, or the varied modernist types 
of windows. When a Doric column or a strip window is present, it is experienced as there 
in place of some other order or window that could have been used. When the user 
experiences the building in this way the user "understands" the building as one possible 
expression using a vocabulary or code that is capable of other expressions. This is similar 
to someone who understands the meaning of a word, or a move in a game, through 
knowing the other possible words or moves that could have been used.
 While architectural elements stand in mutual contrasts that are organized loosely 
into vocabularies, and they combine in ways guided by conventions, those conventions 
are not like the strict rules for combining words into sentences. They are more analogous 
to the flexible rules for combining sentences into paragraphs and texts (cp. Donougho 
1987, 62). A column supporting a lintel, or a wall and a window, do not make a sentence 
that predicates some quality of some object. But such sub-groupings can combine with 
each other into a whole that has many of the qualities of a text. Like a text, a building 
makes a separate object that may or may not be a "whole" and that can be analyzed and 
read in different ways. While a building cannot make one precise point about one object, 
it can act as a text might in opening up a whole world of activity and meaning. Also, more 
like a text than a sentence, a building can violate the modes of organization usual for its 
"genre," though those modes remain present as what has been departed from.
 There is no strict separation in architecture between what in sentences might be 
distinguished as "ungrammaticality" and "semantic impertinence," both of which might be 
used in metaphorical moves in Ricoeur's sense of the term. ]
 Like linguistic expressions, a building may be a move in many games at once. The 
choice of architectural vocabulary and the way that vocabulary is handled is also a social 
and political statement. No language game exists alone, though they all have some 
independence. We exist as the intersection of many codes and games, at once constrained 
and constituted by that multiplicity.
 Buildings also have an involvement and bodily presence that cannot be captured 
by speaking about signs and communication systems. Living a building is not like reading 
a message. Some would take this as severely limiting the use of terms like "language" and 
"vocabulary" in discussing architecture (cf. Klotz 1988, 420). I would rather say that this 
points up the mistake in conceiving language as only a matter of signs and communication 
systems.
The Master Language
Consider now the first suggestion mentioned above: in deciding what is feasible in 
a given context, the architect draws from a repertory consisting of all possible architectural 
forms. To describe that repertory we might use geometry. Any building occupies a volume; 
imagine all possible volumes. The task is difficult; there is an uncountably infinite number 
of shapes a volume could have. Combine these with the similar number of possible 
surface treatments. Even granting that not all the shapes would be perceptibly different to 
us and that fewer still would stay upright if built, the number would still be non-
denumerably infinite. Such a repertory is un-surveyable, and so useless to us; we need a 
catalog.
 Yet given the aim of making all possible forms available, we cannot use any 
specific architectural vocabulary to provide a catalog of the possible forms. In terms of the 
suggestion we are considering, specific architectural vocabularies would present subsets of 
the larger collection. What we would need is a master language that makes the total set 
available.
 It would seem that geometry should provide the master language. The platonic 
solids and other simple shapes can be discerned in most constructions; perhaps some 
suitable geometric language could be devised for the total shape of all buildings. But this 
is doubtful; what set of purely geometrical elements would serve equally well to analyze, 
say, Isozaki's Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art (whose decomposition into 
simpler solids seems straightforward), Hagia Sophia (where the decomposition is 
ambiguous), a New England farmhouse (where the small deviations from regular shapes 
are important in the design), and Porre's Cuban Center (where the historical and biological 
associations overwhelm any purely geometric analysis). A great many abstract geometrical 
analyses can be applied to these buildings, but it is not clear how we would select the 
basic analysis; there is no one clear canonical decomposition of the total shape suitable 
for every case. Even if this were possible, such analysis would be more relevant to some 
buildings than to others.
 Other purported master languages have been based on functional analyses. Units 
such as entrances, walls, stairs, windows, or functions such as entering, supporting, 
extending, ascending, and so on, have been suggested. Though none of these proposals 
have been worked out in sufficient detail, they all run into problems. Either the number of 
basic units multiplies without clear boundaries, or else the language is applied with great 
difficulty to the variety of styles, periods, and cultures already available. As heuristic 
methods of analysis such proposals have their merits, but when employed by architects as 
a supposedly universal language, the proposals merely become more local dialects.
 It is certainly possible to point out formal features that show up in virtually all 
architecture. Symmetry, balance, scale, flow of space, and so on, are present (as affirmed 
or as denied) in any building. But these formal characteristics do not make a universal 
vocabulary; they are features that can be exhibited in different ways by different 
vocabularies. They are analogous not to elements of a vocabulary but to features of a text; 
texts can be described as balanced or symmetrical no matter in what language they are 
written.
 Those inclined to structuralism have sought another kind of universal language by 
seeking basic elements from which the various architectural vocabularies might be 
generated. If one gives up the attempt to find one master vocabulary for architecture (as 
people gave up the quest to find some basic vocabulary underlying all the languages 
spoken in the world), one might still seek some kind of elements which while not 
themselves vocabulary items still are universally present. 
The parallel here is phonetic analysis. For example, aspirated and unaspirated 
"k" (as in "kick" vs. "skin") are not distinguished in English (they are allophones of one 
phoneme) but they can be used to differentiate words in ancient Greek or Chinese (there 
they belong to different phonemes). The linguist searches for basic contrasts in terms of 
which the phonemes of all languages are constituted: voiced/unvoiced, aspirated/
unaspirated, tongue placement positions, and many others. Phonemes of any language 
can be analyzed into bundles of these contrasts. Though no languages share exactly the 
same phonemes they all employ the same sub-phonemic contrasts.
 Phonetic analysis is astoundingly successful. Attempts to perform the same analysis 
on the lexical level by finding basic "sememes" behind all words have met with less 
success. If there were architectural parallels to these kinds of analysis they would not 
themselves be items in any architect's vocabulary but rather those basic elements from 
which any vocabulary was constituted. One might imagine perhaps items such as 
horizontality/verticality or enclosure/openness. Although some analyses of individual 
styles along these lines have been offered, no convincing universal proposal has been 
constructed.
 Even if successful, such analyses are only useful retrospectively. Phonetic analysis 
provides analyses of existing sound systems, not a list of all possible languages. We could 
form such a list by making all possible combinations of the characteristics, but since the 
list would be produced by exponential multiplication applied twice over (once to generate 
the phonemes and once to collect them into possible languages) the results would be, 
while finite in number, inconveniently large. The same difficulty would hamper any 
proposal to find a usable scheme of elements behind all architectural vocabularies.
 There is a still more basic difficulty in the architectural case. The success of 
phonetic analysis depends on the limited number of ways a stream of air can be modified 
by our human vocal organs. It would not be possible to analyze with the same concepts 
the speech of an alien who produced sounds by a tympanum that did not use a stream of 
air. The primitives of phonetic analysis cannot analyze musical sounds in all their variety. 
Although there are many constraints on architectural form, the possible variations are not 
so constricted as to be likened to the limited possibilities of human speech. They are like 
the wider possibilities of musical sound.
 Another suggestion is to develop a master language from building types (market, 
church, meeting hall, city office, home, and so on). But types do not form a language. 
Building types have more independence than words, because they get their identity not 
only from relations to one another but from reference to our social activities. But our 
social activities involve too much bricolage for them to fit into a useful master language. 
New types are invented when the underlying activity changes, as we can see from the 
efforts of the modern movement to find architectural forms for new industrial and 
commercial activities that had already developed independently. So no master list of 
building types is possible.
 Thus there seems to be no sense in which we can say that the architect draws 
concrete possibilities from some repertory that includes all possible architectural forms.
Equal Access to History
The second suggestion was to limit the architect's repertory to all historical forms, 
or at least to all documented historical forms. This suggestion runs into a number of 
problems. It does not mean much to say that historical forms are available until one has 
specified a mode of presentation that will make them accessible to the design process. But 
if there is no master language, no mode of presentation will be sure to present "all" the 
historical forms. (And would it do justice to those novel forms that enlarge the historical 
repertory? I will be discussing the enlargement of architect possibilities in a later chapter, 
so I leave this question aside.)
 Even granting for the sake of argument that there is some system for making 
historical forms available, there are still grave problems. Only if it could all be kept at an 
equal distance would all history be equally available. But some historical forms are 
unavailable to us.
 It seems strange to claim that some parts of history are unavailable to us. Can't we 
build any form we know about? We could build a Gothic cathedral, reproduce the temple 
at Jerusalem, build a ziggurat.
 But could we really reproduce the ancient buildings? We could certainly build a 
copy of a Gothic cathedral. It would have the same geometrical form. Likely we would not 
use the same system of construction; it would be very expensive to build the cathedral as 
they built it, and we are not sure of all the details of the process. But we could make a 
copy that would look the same. Or would it? Our exact copy would not be in the right 
place. Even surviving Gothic cathedrals no longer have the same look now that they are 
embedded in a new society. Even believers must see them differently now. For one thing 
they no longer dominate the skyline of their cities. Nor are their plazas used in the same 
way. We cannot live a Gothic cathedral in the old way, because we do not live the life the 
building originally fitted into. Nor do we have the fertility cults or royal hierarchy to "do" a 
ziggurat. Religious buildings are the most obvious examples of this lack of fit, but an 
Indian bazaar, a Greek theater, or a Renaissance piazza would do as well. Our copy 
would stand in our space, surrounded by our buildings and activities. It would not shape 
lives in the old way.
 There is an additional problem if we try to build in an ancient genre but do not 
make an exact copy. We may work from documents and surviving buildings, but we 
cannot be sure we know how to build a new shape that would fit the old rules. It takes an 
ongoing form of life, Wittgenstein would say, to decide whether a proposed example 
extends the series or violates the rules. That ongoing community is not available to us. 
Even when the rules are written down, as in Vitruvius or Alberti, there still needs to be a 
community to decide what counts as following the rules.
 These are limits we cannot will or create away. We have no equal access to history. 
On the other hand, we are not imprisoned within fixed limits; we can envision other forms 
of life, but we cannot on our own make the decisions such a community might enact.
 My argument so far has presupposed that we want access to history that will allow 
us to continue the past. What if we gave up the ideal of continuity, paid no attention to 
how the past understood or analyzed their forms, broke historical forms into parts in any 
way we chose, and used those parts in our current ironic play and parody? Then would not 
history be equally available, with all its distances abolished?
 This would be postmodernism with a vengeance (a vengeance against time, as 
Nietzsche would say), replacing any hermeneutical ideal of continuity or understanding 
with the parodic manipulation of text fragments. But whatever the success of this in 
literary art, it cannot succeed in architecture, since buildings are to fit into ongoing 
activities. If the architect's dealings with past forms were as free of the need to understand 
the past as the parody method suggests, then there would be no need to deal with the past 
at all. One might as well use a random number table to generate the forms, but 
randomness abolishes parody.
 If the past becomes only a repertory of abstract shape and building fragments, it is 
true that we are freed from the obligation to understand it, but neither is there any longer a 
second level of meaning to play with. Unless the fragments of historical forms carry some 
understanding of their use in their home environment, they cannot be twisted to produce 
parody or irony. The composition becomes a flat assemblage with no interaction between 
meanings. Parodic use requires understanding. But if any understanding of the historical 
forms of life is required, then there is no equal access to history.
Vocabularies and Memories
Our third suggestion is that the repertory that forms the background of the 
architect's work is simply those forms and styles that the architect has encountered. In 
some sense this has to be correct, but how does the architect relate to those possibilities?
 Imagine an assiduous architect who has photographed every angle of every 
building he or she has ever seen, has kept a copy of every architectural journal and 
photocopied every picture in every book he or she has read. This architect's memory of 
buildings and types is available; it can be surveyed and cross-indexed. Is that archive the 
field of forms the architect works from? No, for we would have to add the architect's 
dreams, reveries, the flitting dance of possibilities as the pencil hovers. Even if there were 
some way to catch all these forms, how would we organize them? Any order we come up 
with is unstable, for tomorrow the architect might see the memories in a new light. It 
happens in literature: Joyce changes the way we read Virgil. It happens in architecture: 
Venturi makes us see Luytens again, Gaudi becomes important and old memories are 
rearranged. The past, even the personally experienced past, does not stay fixed enough to 
provide a secure base.
 Architectural possibilities do not line up neatly for inspection, and there is no 
algorithm that will generate them in a surveyable order. Whether we are talking about 
abstractly possible forms, historically realized forms, or personally experienced forms, the 
architect needs some mode of organization and presentation to define a useful repertory. 
The architect needs a vocabulary that generates a set of basic forms or types and suggests 
ways of combining and decomposing them.
 I have been arguing that the architect cannot relate to possible forms without a 
vocabulary, for only by mutual contrast are possibilities made definite. Yet no architect 
today knows only one vocabulary. Again we can ask where the architect lives: if I can 
build in five vocabularies where am I? hovering over them in empty space? No, for once 
again there is no equal access; there are relative differences in availability. There will be 
saliences and distances, with some styles or vocabularies taking a foreground position.
 These differences of availability are not an unimportant by-product; they are part of 
what allows there to be a repertory of styles. There are multiple causes of such saliences 
and distances, and of the particular axes along which the contrasts run. Few of them are 
matters over which the architect has much control. And if the architect deliberately goes 
against the currently salient vocabularies, the desired effect will depend on the accepted 
configuration retaining its hold.
 Relations of contrast among styles and vocabularies provide meaning. Speaking of 
the classic orders, Jencks quotes Gombrich's point that "within the medium at the 
architects' disposal, Doric is clearly more virile than Corinthian" (Jencks 1977, 118). The 
orders exist as orders by standing in relations to one another along a variety of axes. But, 
as Jencks also points out, the intrusion of a new style (the Gothic-Hindu as Nash used it) 
disrupts the relations and changes the relative positions of the styles along the same axes 
(72).
 There must be a limited number of salient styles or vocabularies related along 
various accepted axes of contrast. If there were an indefinite plurality of styles and none 
were particularly salient as the highest in this or that quality, then the problems we saw 
earlier with the suggestions about all possible forms would recur on this level. Without sets 
of differences there are no meanings. It is true that the notion of fixed meanings may need 
deconstructive therapy, but that will not mush all styles together into some vague identity.
 Such a mash of styles is where some fear postmodern architecture is leading us. 
This is rightly condemned even as we admit that we have it always with us. Just as no 
language can avoid the possibility of flabby metaphors, so no configuration of styles can 
avoid the possibility of bland mixtures. But this does not mean that above the various 
styles there is some universal platform from which the architect can perform the mixtures 
well or badly. I have been arguing that the architect does not float freely over an unlimited 
field of possibilities but must live somewhere within a limited configuration of styles and 
vocabularies. A universalism that banishes history for the sake of the master language fails, 
as does a universalism that declares ironic equal access to all history.
 The plurality of architectural vocabularies means that we should suspect claims to 
universality, but also that we should use what historical contrasts and continuities we do 
find, since these are all there is to architectural language. If we cannot base ourselves on 
some master vocabulary, neither can we wish away what meanings are already embodied 
in our ongoing local practices. That is what the modern movement tried and failed to do.
 This conclusion may seem to suggest we are in the imagined situation of the 
premodern builder imprisoned within a small compass of styles, without the self-
consciousness we value so highly. How do we avoid being imprisoned by our limits? In 
the following chapters I examine how we extend our limits and criticize ourselves.
